Such ostensive modest definition hides the central importance of the concept of representation in the critical philosophy. One better idea of its value can be gotten through the classification of representations that if presents in another part of the Critical one of the pure reason: The sort is the representation in general (representatio). Under it is the representation with conscience (perceptatio). A perception that if it relates solely to the citizen while modification of its state is the sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is knowledge (cognitivo).
This or is intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). What the Kants flame of representations with conscience are called perceptions, that are divided in sensations, or those that if they only relate to the citizen as modification of its state, and in objective perceptions. Kant criticizes, before, the point of view of Leibniz which sensitivity was the confused representation of the things. Kant argues that, for the opposite, sensitivity and its sensations were the appearance of something and the way as we are affected by this something. The objective perception is divided in intuition and concept, becoming related first it ‘ ‘ … immediately with the object and is singular’ ‘ . Already as, the concept, is mentioned in mediate way to the object by means of a signal that can be common to some things.
As much the intuition how much the concept is produced by a espontaneidade act. The intuition, given before all thought, supplies a field in which the multiple of the intuition can appear as a representation. It is, however, the concept that synthecizes the representations in experience and knowledge. The application of a concept to an intuition in judgment is not another thing seno the representation of an object. I think, that, in Kant, it is the originary and supreme transcendental unit of the autoconscincia, I am that he allows the occurrence of the judgment, understood as a representation that must be capable to follow all the other representations.