Tag: philosophy


For Ockham, God gave to the men simply the full power of the use of the secular goods for proper utility, leaving they it freedom to establish, on the base of the straight use of the reason, the convenience to appeal or not to the division of the goods (cf. GHISALBERTI, 1997, P. 281-282). From there Ockham to affirm that he is not contrary to the will divine the institute of the private property. The institution of the private property is of origin human being, therefore suggested to the man for the reason as only way to after put remedy to the cupidez and the avarice unchained in the heart of the man the sin. In fact, after the sin the men did not meet more in conditions to exert that rational domain on the goods lands, as God he had granted to them, and then the reason human being, to keep this use, appealed to the regulation through the law (cf.

GHISALBERTI, 1997, P. 282). On the other hand, Joo XXII, that he defended the divine origin, and therefore natural of the private property, atribua to the initiative human being the duty to only place the stamp of the statutory law in the distribution that if occurs of the goods. Ockham talks back that the institutions human beings had not been limited to give a legal value to the division of the ownerships, but is they who had created the ownership. In the related shock, the best conclusion that if can arrive on the thought of Ockham is: the origin of property right is divine and human being jointly. Divine, while the root of the power to assume itself of the goods is constituted by the college granted for God the man to make use of all the things that to judge useful its well-being; human being, while God left to the man the college to decide in sight of the circumstances and thanks to the experience, if is more convenient the community or the division of the goods (cf.

Opposite Intuition

Such ostensive modest definition hides the central importance of the concept of representation in the critical philosophy. One better idea of its value can be gotten through the classification of representations that if presents in another part of the Critical one of the pure reason: The sort is the representation in general (representatio). Under it is the representation with conscience (perceptatio). A perception that if it relates solely to the citizen while modification of its state is the sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is knowledge (cognitivo).

This or is intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). What the Kants flame of representations with conscience are called perceptions, that are divided in sensations, or those that if they only relate to the citizen as modification of its state, and in objective perceptions. Kant criticizes, before, the point of view of Leibniz which sensitivity was the confused representation of the things. Kant argues that, for the opposite, sensitivity and its sensations were the appearance of something and the way as we are affected by this something. The objective perception is divided in intuition and concept, becoming related first it ‘ ‘ … immediately with the object and is singular’ ‘ . Already as, the concept, is mentioned in mediate way to the object by means of a signal that can be common to some things.

As much the intuition how much the concept is produced by a espontaneidade act. The intuition, given before all thought, supplies a field in which the multiple of the intuition can appear as a representation. It is, however, the concept that synthecizes the representations in experience and knowledge. The application of a concept to an intuition in judgment is not another thing seno the representation of an object. I think, that, in Kant, it is the originary and supreme transcendental unit of the autoconscincia, I am that he allows the occurrence of the judgment, understood as a representation that must be capable to follow all the other representations.